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NOTES
THE DUBIOUS ORIGINS AND DANGERS OF CLAWBACK
AND QUICK-PEEK AGREEMENTS:
AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THEIR CODIFICATION IN THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
INTRODUCTION
Evidence today is seemingly all electronic. No modern attorney
can ignore the unique challenges posed by the digitization of the
evidence-gathering process.1 Consider some statistics, remarkable
in their implications for corporate litigators: most companies store
up to seventy percent of their records in electronic form;2 large
corporate computer networks store backup data measured in
terabytes, or one million megabytes, with each terabyte equating to
five hundred billion pages of typewritten text;3 as much as fifty
percent of all information generated by companies never gets
1. See MICHELE C.S. LANGE & KRISTIN M. NIMSGER, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE AND
DISCOVERY: WHAT EVERY LAWYER SHOULD KNOW 2 (2004) (explaining that the "electronic
evidence explosion" affects virtually every lawyer, in every practice area, in every case).
2. Id. One author sets the figure even higher, projecting that many companies store as
much as ninety to ninety-five percent of their records electronically. Robert Douglas
Brownstone, Collaborative Navigation of the Stormy e-Discovery Seas, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH.
53, 6 (2004), http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v10i5/article53.pdf.
3. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 11.446, at 86 (annotated by DAVID F. HERR (4th
ed. 2004)).
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printed in hard form;4 and employees in the United States send
more than twenty-five billion e-mail messages per day.5
Scholars and commentators have urged practitioners to face the
realities of dealing with electronic evidence, cautioning that a
familiarity with applicable rules and case law is essential for
effective representation.6 Although the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure largely apply to the discovery of electronic information,7
they are incomplete as to several highly salient issues.' Nor is the
case law fully satisfactory in providing practitioners with guidance
in navigating through the complexities of electronic discovery. An
unfortunate result of this lack of direction from Congress and the
bench is the rising popularity of clawback and quick-peek agree-
4. JoANE. FELDMAN, ESSENTIALS OF ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: FINDINGAND USING CYBER
EVIDENCE 1-2 (2003). Feldman notes that, in fact, many banks and insurance companies, in
addition to manufacturing, service, and retail sales businesses, store records exclusively in
electronic form. Id.
5. Stephen E. Noona, The Discovery and Introduction of Electronic Evidence in Federal
Court, in VIRGINIA CLE, THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY III-1 (2003).
Further illustrating the extent to which e-mail has overtaken commerce, Microsoft's
computer network now receives 250 to 300 million messages per month from outside the
company. Letter from Thomas W. Burt, Vice President and Deputy Gen. Counsel, Microsoft
Corp., to the Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the United
States 1 (Dec. 16, 2004) [hereinafter Microsoft Letter], available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/rulesle-discovery/ 04-CV-001.pdf. Internal messages alone average sixty to ninety million
per month. Id.
6. See FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 1-2 ("[P]ractitioners who limit their search to paper
discovery have the potential for missing out on vast amounts of crucial information."); LANGE
& NIMSGER, supra note 1, at 4 ("In order to discharge their duties to clients, lawyers
practicing in the 21st century must now be prepared to handle this modern form of evidence,
along with all the new and unique technical and legal issues that come along with it.").
7. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 3, § 11.446, at 87 (noting that
electronic data that is relevant and non-privileged is routinely discoverable under Federal
Rules 26 and 34); Noona, supra note 5, at 111-3 (noting that electronic information is
discoverable under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is encompassed by the
traditional relevance and privilege rules).
8. In addition to privilege waiver, discussed infra Part I, the drafters of the proposed
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure saw an acute need to codify rules
addressing early attention to electronic discovery issues, such as the form of production
required for electronic data, the discovery of electronic information not reasonably accessible,
and sanctions for spoliation of electronic evidence. REPORT OF THE CmL RULES ADVISORY
COMMITTEE 2-6 (2004) [hereinafter REPORT], available at http://www.krollontrack.com/
publications/publiccomment.pdf.
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ments,9 which may save lawyers time, but which may also raise a
host of legal and ethical issues.
The pretrial process of privilege review now represents an
increasingly weighty part of dealing with electronic evidence.
Virtually all discovery now involves staggering volumes of electronic
information;1 ° attorneys must therefore be cognizant of the risks of
unintentionally disclosing a privileged document to the opposing
side. An attorney who negligently, or even innocently, allows
privileged information to leak to opposing counsel may effect a
waiver of his client's privilege. The Manual for Complex Litigation
addresses the laborious nature of modern document production and
raises a concern shared by practitioners nationwide:
Broad database searches may be necessary, requiring safe-
guards against exposing confidential or irrelevant data to the
opponent's scrutiny. A responding party's screening of vast
quantities of unorganized computer data for privilege prior to
production can be particularly onerous in those jurisdictions in
which inadvertent production of privileged data may constitute
a waiver of privilege as to a particular item of information, items
related to the relevant issue, or the entire data collection. Fear
of the consequences of inadvertent waiver may add cost and
delay to the discovery process for all parties."
The California district judge who authored the majority opinion
in United States ex rel. Bagley v. TRW, Inc.2 voiced a similar
grievance with the rule that inadvertent disclosure of a privileged
document may result in waiver. He lamented that a strict approach
to waiver may lead to "socially wasteful behavior, such as the
adoption of elaborate and expensive precautions to avoid the
9. Clawback and quick-peek agreements are protocols which allow attorneys to
economize their privilege reviews and to produce privileged documents to opposing counsel
with impunity.
10. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 3, § 11.446, at 86; see also LANGE &
NIMSGER, supra note 1, at 48 ("Any lawyer who has engaged in large scale document review
understands that the task of reviewing every single piece of paper to determine whether it
contains privilege is Herculean."); REPORT, supra note 8, at 8 ('The volume of [electronic]
information and the informality of certain kinds of electronic communications, such as e-
mails, make privilege review more difficult, time-consuming, and expensive.").
11. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 3, § 11.446, at 89.
12. 204 F.R.D. 170 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
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inadvertent production of privileged documents, the cost of which
may far exceed the social cost of alternative ways of solving the
problem."'" The delay and expense associated with adopting a
hyper-careful approach to privilege review, the court reasoned, may
be compounded by the necessity of using not only teams of partners
and associates to screen for privilege, but also using paralegals and
law clerks.
14
Many lawyers, frustrated with the delays and risks associated
with privilege reviews in the electronic age, have taken measures
designed to save valuable time and to protect themselves against
the consequences of privilege waiver. Parties are increasingly
entering into clawback and quick-peek agreements, 5 which de-
necessitate a traditional privilege review process.' 6
In a clawback arrangement, both parties to a dispute agree in
writing that inadvertent production of privileged materials will not
automatically constitute a waiver of privilege.' 7 If the producing
party realizes the disclosure in a reasonable time, he can request
the document's return, or "claw it back," and the other party must
13. Id. at 177 n.10.
14. Id.; see also LANGE & NIMSGER, supra note 1, at 48 (observing that, in reviewing tens
of thousands, or millions, of documents, paralegals, attorneys, and other reviewers may have
differing judgment with regard to whether documents warrant privileged status).
15. Zubulakev. UBS WarburgLLC, 216F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("[Many parties
to document-intensive litigation enter into so-called 'claw-back' agreements .... ); THE
SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS &
PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 37 (2004), available at
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/SedondaPrinciples2004Ol.pdf ("Given
the enormous volume of electronic documents generated and retained in today's business
environment, and in light of the demands of litigation, there is an increasing interest in
production subject to so-called 'clawback' agreements.'). The Sedona Conference, a research
institution at the forefront of electronic discovery policymaking, treats clawbacks and quick-
peeks as essentially the same. Id. After drawing a definitional distinction between the two
types of agreements, this Note will apply the same analysis to both.
16. REPORT, supra note 8, at 8-9 (explaining that clawbacks and quick-peeks permit
production without an exhaustive initial privilege review and with an agreement that
production of privileged documents does not waive any privileges).
17. Kenneth J. Withers, Electronic Discovery Disputes: Decisional Guidance, CIVIL
ACTION (Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, Williamsburg, Va.), Summer 2004, at 4-5, available at
http://www.ncsconline.orgfProjectsInitiatives/ Images/CivilActionSummerO4.pdf. If the other
side receives a document that is obviously privileged, it must notify opposing counsel or remit
the document to the court. Id.
666
CLAWBACK AND QUICK-PEEK AGREEMENTS
comply.'" The requesting party is presumptively barred from using
the privileged document to further his client's case. 9
Instead of authorizing a less thorough review, a quick-peek
agreement altogether eliminates the need for an initial privilege
review. In this type of arrangement, the requesting party is
allowed to see his opponent's entire data set before production.2 °
The requester identifies relevant information from his opponent's
mass of information.21 The producing party then extracts privi-
leged information from the now smaller set and turns over his
responsive documents and a privilege log.22 As in a clawback
agreement, a quick-peek agreement includes a provision stipulat-
ing that production of privileged documents does not waive any
privileges.23 Ken Withers of the Federal Judicial Center notes that,
as compared with a clawback, a quick-peek agreement "requires an
even higher level of mutual trust and respect between counsel."24
Arguments in favor of clawback and quick-peek agreements
emphasize their value in shielding lawyers from the oft-harsh
consequences of unintentionally disclosing a privileged document
during discovery-a practice not uncommon in complex litigation.2"
In response to concerns such as those expressed by the judge in
Bagley, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee touts that these
agreements "can facilitate prompt and economical discovery by
reducing delay before the discovering party obtains access to
documents, and reducing the cost and burden of review by the
producing party."26 Professor Rick Marcus offers a utilitarian
justification for quick-peek agreements:
18. Id.
19. Whitney Adams & Mark Tuohey, Clawback Agreements Help Protect Privileged
Documents, 231 N.Y. L.J. T4 (2004).
20. Withers, supra note 17, at 5.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. REPORT, supra note 8, at 8-9.
24. Withers, supra note 17, at 5.
25. See id. ("[A]ttorneys will need to manually review tens of thousands (if not millions)
of e-mail messages, word-processing documents, and other files to make privilege
determinations. Errors are inevitable.'); Adams & Tuohey, supra note 19 ('The electronic age
has led to a huge increase in company documents, which exponentially increases the risk
that, buried within the mountain of files handed over to the other side, some privileged
documents will be inadvertently disclosed.").
26. REPORT, supra note 8, at 30.
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Because document requests are often very broad, and the
responsive material is therefore often of no real interest to the
party seeking production, undertaking the laborious task of
reviewing all this material before the other side gets to look at
it is highly wasteful if the other side then says it is really
interested in only 10% of the material. Wouldn't it be more
sensible to postpone the privilege review until the 10% had been
identified? That could save the producing party money, and save
the party seeking discovery time.27
If clawback and quick-peek agreements have the potential to
make lawyers' discovery protocols easier and more cost-effective,
why does the Sedona Conference admonish that "there are a host of
risks and problems that make [these types of] productions impracti-
cable and, for most cases, ill-advised?"2 This Note will examine why
these concededly efficient agreements serve to undermine lawyer
professionalism and the common law foundations of privilege
jurisprudence. In light of proposed amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which would endorse the formation of
clawbacks and quick-peeks, this Note will explain why these two
mechanisms, and their codification in the Rules, raise serious issues
with respect to common law privilege waiver, ethical duties of
lawyers, third-party dangers of entering into a privilege waiver
agreement, and judicial authority to modify substantive privilege
doctrine.
To provide a backdrop for later analyses of the deficiencies of
clawbacks and quick-peeks, Part I will discuss the proposed
amendments to the Federal Rules and their formal recognition of
the validity of these agreements. Part II, in arguing that clawbacks
27. Memorandum from Professor Rick Marcus to the Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules 26
(Sept. 15, 2003) [hereinafter Marcus Memorandum], available at http://www.kenwithers.
comrulemaking/civilruleslmarcus 091503a.pdf. Professor Marcus argues that quick-peeks
are especially advantageous when reviewing electronic data:
Discovery regarding electronically-stored materials may involve having one
party query its computer system according to directions from the other side. At
the time the query is used, the parties don't know what it will elicit, much less
whether that might be privileged. So a quick look might be quite helpful in that
situation.
Id. at 27.
28. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 15, at 37.
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and quick-peeks defy the common law, will explore various
jurisdictions' approaches to privilege waiver and highlight the
majority consensus on the importance of thorough privilege reviews.
Part III will then discuss the implications of clawback and quick-
peek agreements for attorneys' ethical duties of competence and
confidentiality. Part IV will address commentators' concerns about
the effects of clawbacks or quick-peeks on third parties and in
subsequent litigation. Emphasizing courts' lack of authority to give
effect to parties' privilege waiver agreements, Part V will question
whether the federal judiciary has the power to modify substantive
privilege law under the Rules Enabling Act. Finally, Part VI will
present solutions for practitioners fearful of inadvertent disclo-
sure that avoid the need to enter into a clawback or quick-peek
agreement and better comport with lawyers' obligation of zealous
representation.
The Note will conclude by concurring with the Sedona
Conference's ominous assessment of clawback and quick-peek
agreements: because these devices run contrary to the common law,
pose thorny ethical dilemmas, and risk losing their force with other
parties or in other fora, they should not substitute for a traditional
privilege review even if ultimately condoned in the Federal Rules.
I. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
The Civil Rules Advisory Committee has come to the stark
realization that the Rules need updating to deal with the complexi-
ties of electronic discovery. Some of the proposed revisions have
generated little comment and may pass through the Supreme Court
without controversy. Others may continue to face formidable
opposition. Given the authority and ethical issues raised by
formally sanctioning clawbacks and quick-peeks, proposed Rule 26
and its related provisions hopefully will remain a source of vigorous
debate in the legal community.
The Advisory Committee has conducted various studies and
hosted a number of conferences on the idea of amending the Federal
Rules to adapt to the electronically sophisticated litigation
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climate.29 By 2002, local district and state courts had begun
adopting their own electronic discovery rules, the American Bar
Association (ABA) and the Sedona Conference had distributed best
practices manuals, the Manual for Complex Litigation had been
updated to include a section on electronic discovery, hosts of
conferences and seminars had been convened to address hot
electronic discovery issues, and courts had been weighing in more
and more in electronic discovery disputes.
30
In response to this surge in scholarship, the Advisory Committee
disseminated for comment "straw proposals" by leading academics
and practitioners.3 1 The generated feedback showed a clear need for
reform, and the Committee's conference in February 2004 yielded
the first set of proposed amendments dealing with electronic
discovery.32 These amendments were published in August 2004 and
were open for public comment until February 15, 2005." At its April
2005 meeting, the Advisory Committee synthesized all of the public
comments and voted to approve amendments to Rules 16, 26, 33,
34, and 45.34 On June 16, 2005, the Standing Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure approved this package of e-discovery
amendments.35 The Judicial Conference unanimously approved the
proposals on September 20, 2005,36 and a Supreme Court determi-
nation is expected by the spring of 2006.37 Congress may then act
independently on the amendments if it chooses.3" The earliest any
of the amendments could take effect is December 1, 2006."
29. Kenneth J. Withers, Two Tiers and a Safe Harbor: The Electronic Discovery
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 3 (Aug. 25, 2004) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.krollontrack.com/publications/twotiers.pdf.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 4.
32. Id. at 4-5.
33. Id. at 5.
34. Advisory Committee Approves Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
http://www.ediscoverylaw.com/cat-federal-rules-amendments-.html (Apr. 21, 2005).
35. Standing Committee Approves Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, http://www.ediscoverylaw.com/cat-federal-rules-amendments-.html (June 16,
2005).
36. Judicial Conference Approves Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, http://www.ediscoverylaw.com/cat-federal-rules-amendments-.html (Sept. 20,
2005).
37. Id.
38. Withers, supra note 29, at 6.
39. Id.
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A series of proposed rules provides that, if parties can agree to a
protocol that allows for document production without a complete
privilege review and protects against waiver, a court may enter a
case management order implementing their agreement.4" Proposed
Rule 26(b)(5)(B) states:
If information is produced in discovery that is subject to a claim
of privilege or protection as trial-preparation material, the party
making the claim may notify any party that received the
information of the claim and the basis for it. After being notified,
a party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the speci-
fied information and any copies it has and may not use or
disclose the information until the claim is resolved.41
Rule 26(f) was revised to allow parties to agree to a privilege waiver
proposal at their planning conference.42 Amended Form 35 includes
a provision whereby parties can report any such agreement to the
court,43 and Rule 16(b) grants courts the authority to enter a case
management order implementing the privilege waiver agreement
reached by the parties.44
40. REPORT, supra note 8, at 9.
41. Proposed FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(B), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
Reports/CV5-2005.pdf. The Proposed Amendments to the ABA Civil Discovery Standards also
authorize courts to enter orders giving effect to both clawback and quick-peek agreements.
See ABA SECTION OF LITIG., ABA CIVIL DIscovERY STANDARDS 32(b), (d), at 71-72 (Aug. 2004),
available at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/discoverystandards/2004civildiscovery
standards.pdf. Although the amendments sanction clawbacks and quick-peeks, the comments
pinpoint some of the attendant dangers in such agreements. For example, the drafters
recognize that "parties using the [quick-peek] approach may know or be fairly certain that
privileged material is contained in the mass of data to be extracted." Id.
42. Proposed FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(4), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/
CV5-2005.pdf. Parties must meet at least twenty-one days prior to their scheduling
conference
to develop a proposed discovery plan that indicates the parties' views and
proposals concerning ... any issues relating to claims of privilege or protection
as trial-preparation material, including-if the parties agree on a procedure to
assert such claims after production-whether to ask the court to include their
agreement in an order ...."
Id.
43. Proposed FED. R. Civ. P. Form 35, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
Reports/CV5-2005.pdf.
44. Proposed FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(6), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/
CV5-2005.pdf. The Proposed Rule provides that "the district judge ... shall, after receiving
the report from the parties under Rule 26(f) or after consulting with the attorneys for the
2005]
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Proposed Rule 26(b)(5)(B) would operate to protect lawyers in
classic inadvertent waiver situations in which a traditional
privilege review is carried out, but one or several documents
accidentally slip through the cracks.45 In addition, the rule clearly
gives credence to the clawback approach, allowing parties to
retrieve inadvertently disclosed documents after production.46
Because the drafters did not limit the Rule's application to
inadvertent disclosures, proposed 26(b)(5)(B) can be read to
authorize quick-peek agreements-which involve the purposeful
offering of privileged information-as well. Indeed, the May 2005
Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee echoes the 2004
Report in advertising the merits of clawbacks, quick-peeks, and
"[o]ther voluntary arrangements [which] may be appropriate
depending on the circumstances of each litigation."47
Practitioners have expressed concern about the implications of
the proposed rule, including its effects of disincentivizing adequate
privilege reviews and causing docket-conscious judges to hold
attorneys to "unreasonable time frames" with their document
production.4" Although 26(b)(5)(B) and its companion proposals do
not require that parties agree to a clawback or quick-peek, or
parties ... enter a scheduling order .... The scheduling order may also include ... any
agreements the parties reach for asserting claims of privilege or protection as trial-
preparation material after production...." Id.
45. Withers, supra note 29, at 2.
46. Id. at 25.
47. REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE 36 (2005), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rulesfReports/CV5-2005.pdf.
48. Mary P. Gallagher, Federal Courts Propose Rules for E-Discovery, N.J. L.J., Sept. 6,
2004; see also Testimony of National Association of Consumer Advocates Before the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the United States 2
(Jan. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Testimony] ("The proposal to amend Rule 26(b)(5)(B) to allow a
dilatory assertion of privilege will encourage sloppy initial production and gamesmanship.");
Letter from Scott C. Lucas, Attorney, to the Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure,
Judicial Conference of the United States (Jan. 10, 2005) ("[T]his proposal encourages sloppy
discovery practices and penalizes litigants who are proactively preparing their case.");
Microsoft Letter, supra note 5, at 23.
[W]e oppose any addition to the Rules that would influence parties to adopt
agreements regarding privilege waiver-particularly insofar as such
agreements may serve to pressure parties into the premature production of
privileged material.... We are also concerned that courts will pressure a litigant
who complains of cost to adopt an alternative review approach.
672 [Vol. 47:663
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authorize judges to order one absent the parties' agreement,49 these
rules grant lawyers the leeway to experiment with protocols,
despite far-reaching negative consequences.
The Advisory Committee clarifies that proposed 26(b)(5)(B) is
not intended to settle the matter of whether a privilege is waived
when either a classic inadvertent waiver, clawback, or quick-peek
situation comes before a court.5 ° The drafters emphasize that they
are "respecting the special statutory procedures in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2074(b) for adopting rules that modify a privilege."'" Thus, the
rule ostensibly stops short of abrogating the common law of waiver,
which would be achieved if the new rule stated that privileges
would not be waived in any of the contemplated scenarios."
Despite their assurance that they are not overstepping their
rulemaking authority under the Rules Enabling Act, the Advisory
Committee is nonetheless standing on shaky ground with the
changes to Rule 26(b). Strong doubts remain as to whether the
judiciary is foraying into substantive evidentiary law-even by
allowing parties to enter into clawbacks and quick-peeks and
allowing courts to enforce them, without mandating such agree-
ments or making a definitive determination on privilege waiver.
Ken Withers comments on the ongoing controversy about whether
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are the proper forum for
changing the nature of privilege review:
The burden of reviewing vast electronic files for privilege before
production was perceived by nearly all commentators as a major
one, and nearly all commentators agreed that something needed
to be done to provide relief from this perceived burden. The
controversy was, and will remain, whether the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure are an appropriate vehicle for addressing this
issue, and even if they are deemed to be appropriate, how far
civil procedure rules can go to solve a problem that involves
aspects of common law, evidence doctrine, and legal ethics.5"
49. REPORT, supra note 8, at 9.
50. Id. at 13.
51. Id.
52. Withers, supra note 29, at 10-11.
53. Id. at 23.
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The following sections of this Note will explore these aspects of
clawback and quick-peek agreements before returning to the
overarching authority question.
II. COMMON LAW APPROACHES TO PRIVILEGE WAIVER
Courts' rulings on the character of disclosure required to waive
an evidentiary privilege have varied, but most courts stress the
importance of a diligent privilege review. The strict approach
followed by some courts holds that any inadvertent disclosure
results in a waiver.54 A minority of courts favor the lenient ap-
proach, whereby a waiver is effected only in cases of deliberate
disclosure or extreme negligence.5' The trend is toward a balancing
approach: most modern jurisdictions adopt an intermediate, case-
by-case test taking into account (1) the reasonableness of precau-
tions taken to prevent disclosure, (2) the number of inadvertent
disclosures, (3) the extent of the disclosure, (4) the remedial
measures taken, and (5) considerations of fairness and justice.8
A. The Strict Approach
In re Sealed Case typifies the strict approach.57 Not only had
the defendant contractor's chief accounting officer (CAO) disclosed
a privileged memorandum to the Defense Contract Audit Agency,
but the company's vice president had turned over six privileged
documents to the government pursuant to an immunity
agreement. 51 In holding that the attorney-client privilege attached
to the disclosed documents had been waived, the court reasoned
that "[a]lthough the attorney-client privilege is of ancient lineage
and continuing importance, the confidentiality of communications
covered by the privilege must be jealously guarded by the holder...
lest it be waived. The courts will grant no greater protection to
those who assert the privilege than their own precautions
54. Adams & Tuohey, supra note 19.
55. Id.; Douglas L. Lineberry, Inadvertently Disclosed Documents: What Are Your Ethical
Obligations?, 14 S.C. LAW. 40, 42 (2003).
56. Lineberry, supra note 55, at 42.
57. 877 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
58. Id. at 977-78.
674 [Vol. 47:663
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warrant."59 The court found that the disclosure by the defendant's
CAO happened only because someone in the company, and therefore
the company itself, was careless in providing for the confidentiality
of the privileged communications.6 ° In an oft-cited passage, the
court warned that "if a client wishes to preserve the privilege, it
must treat the confidentiality of attorney-client communications
like jewels-if not crown jewels."'" Finally, the court ruled that
waiver of the attorney-client privilege extends to all communica-
tions relating to the same subject matter.62
Advocates of the strict approach to waiver point to its commit-
ment to liberal discovery and its truth-seeking function." More
importantly for the profession, the strict approach provides
incentives for attorneys to take due care with their clients' docu-
ments.64
59. Id. at 980.
60. Id.
61. Id. The "crown jewels" level of care applies with equal force to the client's attorney,
who can cause a waiver of privilege through his negligence in handling client confidences.
Id.
62. Id. at 980-81. See also SEC v. Lavin, 111 F.3d 921, 929 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("In the
attorney-client context, this court adheres to a strict rule on waiver of privileges.... [The
holder [of the privilege] must zealously protect the privileged materials, taking all reasonable
steps to prevent their disclosure."). Other courts have echoed the unyielding pronouncements
of the D.C. Circuit. See, e.g., F.C. Cycles Int'l, Inc. v. Fila Sport, S.p.A., 184 F.R.D. 64, 76 (D.
Md. 1998) ("[T]here is more support for the theory that the Fourth Circuit favors the 'strict'
... approach of full waiver upon disclosure-whether inadvertent, voluntary, or implied.").
63. Roberta M. Harding, Waiver: A Comprehensive Analysis of a Consequence of
Inadvertently Producing Documents Protected by the Attorney-Client Privilege, 42 CATH. U.
L. REV. 465, 504 (1993); Joshua Simko, Note, Inadvertent Disclosure, the Attorney-Client
Privilege, and Legal Ethics: An Examination and Suggestion for Alaska, 19 ALASKA L. REV.
461, 465 (2002). For a detailed analysis of the merits and flaws of each of the three
approaches to privilege waiver, see also Trina Jones, Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged
Information and the Law of Mistake: Using Substantive Legal Principles to Guide Ethical
Decision Making, 48 EMORY L.J. 1255, 1273-76 (1999).
64. Shawn T. Gaither, The Attorney-Client Privilege: An Analysis of Involuntary Waiver,
48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 311, 315 (2000). One author notes:
[T]he lawyer's duty of zealous advocacy is perhaps the strongest argument in
favor of the strict responsibility approach. It is not the receiving lawyer's
responsibility to maintain the attorney-client privilege for his adversary .... If
an attorney does not want an adversary to use information she considers
confidential, she should take care not to disclose it in the first place.
Simko, supra note 63, at 467.
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B. The Lenient Approach
In contrast to the strict approach, the lenient view espoused by
a minority of courts offers "little incentive for a lawyer to maintain
tight control over privileged documents. '65 Although hailed for
placing a premium on the attorney-client privilege and for not
punishing the client for his lawyer's mistake,6 the relaxed approach
to privilege waiver "ignores the confidentiality aspect of the
privilege."67 Authorities disagree as to which of the two approaches
better safeguards the attorney-client privilege.68
The Illinois District Court in Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co.69
employed the lenient test in declining to find a waiver by virtue of
plaintiffs counsel's inadvertent disclosure of a privileged letter to
defendant's counsel.7" The court opined that waiver can result only
from "the 'intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right"'-not from an innocent, inadvertent disclosure.7 More than
mere negligence, according to the court, is required to extinguish
the attorney-client privilege:
Mendenhall's lawyer... might well have been negligent in failing
to cull the files of the letters before turning over the files. But if
we are serious about the attorney-client privilege and its
relation to the client's welfare, we should require more than
such negligence by counsel before the client can be deemed to
have given up the privilege.72
65. Gaither, supra note 64, at 316; Simko, supra note 63, at 471-72 ("If there is no threat
of waiver or sanctions, the lawyer has no incentive to protect her client's confidential
documents. The result is a license for sloppy management." (footnote omitted)).
66. Harding, supra note 63, at 503-04 ('The lenient test upholds the important long-
standing attorney-client privilege ... and recognizes that the client, not the attorney, is the
proper holder of the privilege." (footnote omitted)).
67. Gaither, supra note 64, at 316.
68. This Note posits that only a standard which holds lawyers accountable for their
carelessness in handling privileged information can truly be said to further the policies
behind the attorney-client privilege.
69. 531 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
70. Id. at 955.
71. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zerlost, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
72. Id.; see also Helman v. Murry's Steaks, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1099, 1104 (D. Del. 1990)
('"The holder of the privilege is the client. It would fly in the face of the essential purpose of
the attorney/client privilege to allow a truly inadvertent disclosure of a privileged
communication by counsel to waive the client's privilege.").
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A Florida court followed Mendenhall in excusing defendant
Ethan Allen's counsel for inadvertently turning over certain
privileged transcripts to the plaintiff.73 The court, in finding no
waiver as a result of the disclosure, emphasized that the innocence
of the client trumped the negligence on the part of the attorney.74
In this regard we agree with the American Bar Association
Section of Litigation which advises that: Where the disclosure
resulted because of the attorney's negligence and not that of the
client, the client's privilege has not necessarily been relin-
quished. The more modern rationale, therefore, is that the
negligence-free client, whose privilege it is in all events, should
not bear the burden of global loss of an expectation of confidenti-
ality because of the attorney's negligence in protecting that
confidentiality.75
Courts favoring the lenient approach, then, would seem to care
more about preserving client rights than promoting attorney ethics.
C. The Balancing Approach
The balancing approach utilized by a growing number of courts
served to exonerate the defendant company's counsel for the
inadvertent disclosure of eighteen privileged documents in In re
Grand Jury Investigation.76 In applying a multifactor balancing
test, the court first examined the reasonableness of the precautions
taken by defense counsel.77 The company and its counsel underwent
several layers of review in screening for privilege, involving
paralegals, junior and senior associates, and inside and outside
counsel; the defendant's precautions, therefore, were deemed
73. Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
74. Id. at 939.
75. Id. (citing ABA SECTION OF LITIG., THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-
PRODUCT DOCTRINE 66 (2d ed. 1989)).
76. 142 F.R.D. 276, 283 (M.D.N.C. 1992).
77. Id. at 279. The court took note that "many courts in this circuit and elsewhere have
concluded that inadvertent disclosure may constitute a waiver of the privilege where the
circumstances of the disclosure reflect gross negligence or a failure to take reasonable
precautions to avoid the disclosure." Id.
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reasonable.7" The court also found that the ratio of privileged
documents disclosed (18) to the total number of documents reviewed
(300,000) did not suggest inadequate precautions. 79 Nor was the
extent of the disclosure grave. Although documents were handed
over to the government, they had not been viewed by the grand jury
or any witnesses or experts-they had not "worked their way into
the fabric of the case" so as to destroy meaningful confidentiality.8 0
In inquiring as to whether the defendant took immediate action to
remedy the disclosure before the other side had relied on the
material to develop its case, the court found that the company used
reasonable diligence in promptly contacting the government's
counsel."1 Finally, the court found that, because the government
had not yet significantly relied on the disclosed information, justice
did not require a finding of waiver.8 2
By probing the adequacy of a party's privilege review processes,
the balancing approach joins the strict approach in offering
"powerful incentives for attorneys to exercise the utmost care and
professionalism when screening documents."8 3 Although the
intermediate standard is more flexible than the per se approaches,
and more sympathetic to the equities in complex electronic
discovery disputes, it still places heavy emphasis on the perfor-
mance of a thorough privilege review. Courts adhering to the
78. Id. at 279-80. The court offered examples of cases involving inadequate precautions:
a case in which counsel had ample time to review a single box and still disclosed dozens of
privileged documents; a case in which counsel eliminated a review stage that was
customarily performed; and a case in which only two people reviewed tens of thousands of
documents in a single day. Id. at 280.
79. Id. at 281.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 282.
82. Id. There are other illustrations of the balancing approach. See, e.g., United States
v. Rigas, 281 F. Supp. 2d 733, 738-42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (concluding that government did not
waive privilege attaching to paralegal's work product in light of reasonable precautions taken
to secure privileged hard drives; of fact that 130 files were disclosed out of hundreds of
thousands of paper documents, hundreds of CD-ROMs, and additional hard drives; and of
minimal risk of prejudice since defense counsel opted to refrain from viewing files until
resolution of discovery dispute); Fleet Bus. Credit Corp. v. Hill City Oil Co., No. 01-02417,
2002 WL 31741282, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 5, 2002) (finding no waiver because disclosing
party employed adequate screening mechanisms, in which team of three attorneys and one
paralegal reviewed and isolated privileged documents; because thirty out of 16,000
documents was an acceptable margin of error; and because disclosing party acted within days
to rectify situation).
83. Simko, supra note 63, at 475 (footnotes omitted).
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balancing approach do not hesitate to find waiver when a lawyer
has handled his client's confidences in a manner unbefitting a
zealous advocate.
In Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Sandoz, Ltd., 4 the New Jersey District
Court entered a protective order providing that an inadvertent
disclosure by either party would not result in a waiver as to that
disclosure.8 5 The court rejected the proposal by plaintiffs counsel to
honor a blanket disclosure order, "insist[ing] that any such
provision would not excuse the parties from conducting a privilege
review prior to the production of documents, in accordance with
controlling case law."6 Defendant's counsel, without conducting a
privilege review, produced a copy of an internal company memoran-
dum to plaintiffs counsel on two separate occasions.87 The court had
little difficulty finding a waiver here, given the small scope of
documents produced, the lack of time constraints, the failure to
conduct any privilege review, the completeness of the disclosure, the
inadequacy of measures taken to rectify the error, and the interests
of justice in penalizing a party's negligence.88 The same court in
Koch Materials Co. v. Shore Slurry Seals, Inc. 9 refused to enforce
the parties' informal blanket agreement protecting against
inadvertent waiver.9 ° The court asserted that "such blanket
provisions, essentially immunizing attorneys from negligent
handling of documents, could lead to sloppy attorney review and
improper disclosure which could jeopardize clients' cases."9'
Clawback and quick-peek agreements conceivably would be
appropriate discovery devices under a lenient regime, in which even
a knowing disclosure of privileged information would not constitute
waiver. They are antithetical, however, to the tenets underlying the
strict and balancing approaches;92 the latter has gained the
84. 916 F. Supp. 404 (D.N.J. 1995).
85. Id. at 406.
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 412-14.
89. 208 F.R.D. 109 (D.N.J. 2002).
90. Id. at 118.
91. Id.
92. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 15, at 37 (stating that the tenets of privilege
law "usually require the producing party to meticulously guard against the loss of secrecy for
[privileged] materials").
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allegiance of most American jurisdictions.93 The majority of courts
place much importance on the thoroughness of a party's privilege
review processes; the use of clawbacks and quick-peeks effectively
ignores the common law evolution of privilege law.
III. ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CLAWBACKS AND
QUICK-PEEKS
A lawyer who agrees to a clawback or quick-peek agreement
should worry about more than the law of evidence and courts'
attitudes toward privilege waiver. His conduct in handling client
confidences also will be measured against the rules of professional
conduct, which "impose discipline for negligent or reckless behavior
on the part of lawyers."94 Substantial overlap exists between these
rules and the law of evidence:
The way the court rules on matters of inadvertent disclosure of
privileged material under the rules of evidence influences
whether the attorney can be sanctioned under the professional
rules of conduct for breach of confidentiality .... [S]ome of the
justifications for the inadvertent disclosure rules rest upon
notions of professionalism that are outlined in the rules of
professional responsibility."
Voluntarily entering into a clawback or quick-peek agreement
runs the risk of violating the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.96
For example, ABA Model Rule 1.1 states that "[a] lawyer shall
provide competent representation to a client. Competent represen-
tation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."97 The
Rule's comment explains that "[c]ompetent handling of a particular
matter includes ... use of methods and procedures meeting the
standards of competent practitioners. It also includes adequate
93. United States v. Gangi, 1 F. Supp. 2d 256, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("[Tlhe prevailing view
in this District, as well as in the majority of the Circuits, is that a more flexible, 'middle of
the road approach' should be applied."); Adams & Tuohey, supra note 19.
94. Simko, supra note 63, at 462.
95. Id. at 462-63.
96. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 15, at 37.
97. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2003) (emphasis added).
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preparation. The required attention and preparation are deter-
mined in part by what is at stake ." At stake in clawback and
quick-peek arrangements, which discourage a thorough privilege
review, are the possibilities of waiving a client's privilege and
materially damaging his case.
In addition, ABA Model Rule 1.6 orders that "[a] lawyer shall not
reveal information relating to the representation of a client ... 
The rule's comment specifically mandates that a lawyer "act
competently to safeguard information relating to the representation
of a client against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the
lawyer or other persons who are participating in the representation
of the client ....".100 Is a lawyer who dodges the privilege review
process acting competently to safeguard his client's confidential
communications? Opposing counsel is not the only party who may
be privy to client confidences in a clawback or quick-peek scenario:
there is no guarantee that these communications will not become
ammunition for an opponent in later litigation.01 Evidently
recognizing the Rule 1.6 problems posed by clawbacks and quick-
peeks, the ABA's proposed civil discovery amendments caution
parties to contemplate the potential third-party effects of these
agreements. 1
02
Applying their ABA Model Rule analogs, state bar disciplinary
bodies have analyzed the ethical responsibilities of lawyers in
inadvertent disclosure situations. A District of Columbia Bar ethics
opinion, primarily addressing the obligations of lawyers who
inadvertently receive a disclosed privileged document, expressly
warned that a disclosing lawyer may violate his professional duties
of competence: "If... the disclosure occurred because counsel failed
98. MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 5 (2003).
99. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2003).
100. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. (2003).
101. See infra Part IV.
102. ABA SECTION OF LITIG., supra note 41, at 71-72. The text of Civil Discovery Standard
32(b) offers an explicit admonition: "In stipulating to the entry of such an order, the parties
should consider the potential impact that production of privileged or protected data may have
on the producing party's ability to maintain privilege or work-product protection vis-A-vis
third parties not subject to the order." Id. In explaining how to implement a quick-peek
agreement, amended rule 32(d)(ii)(B) contains an almost identical caveat: "Before agreeing
to this procedure, the producing party should consider the potential impact that it may have
on the producing party's ability to maintain privilege or work-product protection attaching
to any such data if subsequently demanded by non-parties." Id.
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to review the documents to be made available to possessing counsel
with the thoroughness and preparation required under Rule 1. 1(a)
or the skill and care required under Rule 1.1(b), the inadvertence
could be an ethical violation."' 3 This opinion, although not speaking
specifically to clawback and quick-peek agreements, contemplates
ethical sanctions for lawyers who shirk their duty to perform a
thorough privilege review.
A Kentucky Bar ethics opinion also forecasted sanctions for the
disclosing lawyer.1"4 The board held that "[w]hether or not the
sending lawyer's inadvertence and possible violation of Rule 1.6 can
waive a privilege presents a question of law."'1 5 Significantly,
although the board declined to offer an opinion on the waiver issue,
it recognized that professional liability could attach to the disclosing
lawyer's conduct. Given the ABA's reservations about some of the
consequences of clawbacks and quick-peeks, and state bars'
seeming distaste for protocols which foreclose a traditional privilege
review, a lawyer who enters into a clawback or quick-peek scheme
could invite two or more ethical breaches-even if his conduct is
blessed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
IV. THIRD-PARTY AND RESIDUAL DANGERS OF CLAWBACKS AND
QUICK-PEEKS
Parties to a clawback or quick-peek agreement also risk not
having their agreement enforced vis-A-vis third parties in later
litigation. In addition, it is virtually impossible for the receiving
lawyer in such an arrangement to erase from memory the privileged
material that he has glimpsed. A clawback or quick-peek, despite
all its protective clauses, simply cannot guarantee against privilege
waiver in other litigation contexts or against strategic use of the
privileged information by opposing counsel in the case covered by
the agreement.
Case law on the issue is thin, but commentators have offered
warnings about the third-party effects of clawbacks and quick-
103. D.C. Bar, Ethics Op. No. 256 (1995).
104. Ky. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. No. E-374 (1995).
105. Id. (emphasis added).
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peeks and about their possible inapplicability in other suits. 10 6
Some courts have rejected parties' claims of privilege pursuant to
protective agreements from prior litigation. In Genentech, Inc. v.
U.S. International Trade Commission, 107 the plaintiff inadvertently
disclosed 12,000 pages of privileged documents in a multi-district
patent infringement suit.08 After the district judge held that
privilege as to those documents had been waived, the administra-
tive law judge (ALJ) presiding over another patent suit involving
Genentech and different defendants ruled that the privilege waiver
extended to that proceeding.109 Genentech argued that no general
waiver applied to the second case because the parties to the district
court case had been subject to a protective order.110 Because the
appeals court determined that Genentech had failed to use
adequate screening procedures to review for privilege in the first
action, the ALJ's finding of waiver in the second proceeding was
sustained."'
In Navajo Nation v. Peabody Holding Co.,112 the court held that
the production provisions of a confidentiality agreement governing
106. ABA SECTION OF LITIG., supra note 41, at 74 ("[I]n current practice, there is no
assurance that a stipulated order providing that inadvertent disclosure does not effect a
waiver will be effective against a claim of waiver asserted by a third party."); Marcus
Memorandum, supra note 27, at 26 ("[O]ne could certainly argue that the parties' agreement
cannot ... foreclose arguments by third parties about whether a waiver has occurred
whatever the parties intended."); THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 15, at 37 ("[D]espite
the strongest possible language in any 'clawback' or 'quick peek' order ... there is no effective
way to limit the arguments of non-parties regarding the legal effect of the production in other
jurisdictions and forums."); Timothy P. Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 AM. U. L. REv. 59,
130-31 (2002) ("[Elven if a party's legal right to claim privilege is not lost upon compelled
disclosure, the cat is out of the bag: the confidences are no longer secret, and, in complex
litigation, adversaries in later proceedings may have gained the benefit of knowing such
confidences . (footnote omitted)); Gallagher, supra note 48 (noting that a state court not
subject to the Federal Rules can easily declare waiver in a state proceeding even if it was not
declared in the prior federal action); Withers, supra note 17, at 5 ("[T]he entire arrangement
can be viewed as 'privilege waiver' by third parties or in subsequent litigation ...."); Withers,
supra note 29, at 27 ("[N]o matter what the parties may agree to and the court may bless, a
third party or a litigant in a parallel action can easily make the case that the agreement does
not bind them, and the parties have consciously waived any [privilege claim] respecting the
entire information collection.").
107. 122 F.3d 1409 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
108. Id. at 1413.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1417.
111. Id. at 1418.
112. 209 F. Supp. 2d 269 (D.D.C. 2002).
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the first action brought by the Navajo Nation did not apply to
defendant's privileged documents, which were made part of the
public record in the prior action and used in oral argument.113 The
court upbraided the defendant for its strategic use of disclosures:
"[P]arties should not be permitted to disclose documents for tactical
purposes in one context, and then claim attorney-client privilege in
another context."
' 114
Regardless of whether a subsequent court decides to enforce a
clawback or quick-peek agreement, the fact remains that the
receiving attorney has been exposed to privileged information and
may still be able to use it to further his client's case. 1 5 Even if that
attorney does not formally seek to enter an inadvertently disclosed
document into evidence, he can use the information contained
therein as a springboard to related documents or testimony. In
effect, the disclosing lawyer may assist his opponent in developing
the latter's trial plan.
V. AUTHORITY TO MODIFY PRIVILEGES UNDER THE RULES
ENABLING ACT
This Note has shown the judicially recognized risks inherent in
clawback and quick-peek agreements, and it expresses the hope
that the bench and bar will lobby against their inclusion in the
amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A critical question
remains: does the federal judiciary have the power to codify these
113. Id. at 284.
114. Id. at 286; see also Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
The client cannot be permitted to pick and choose among his opponents,
waiving the privilege for some and resurrecting the claim of confidentiality to
obstruct others, or to invoke the privilege as to communications whose
confidentiality he has already compromised for his own benefit.... The attorney-
client privilege is not designed for such tactical employment.
Id.
115. See LANGE & NIMSGER, supra note 1, at 49 ('You cannot put the toothpaste back into
the tube.... You cannot erase that information from the memory or minds of counsel despite
a court order to disregard the contents."); Edward C. Bassett, Jr. & James A. Wingfield,
Electronic Discovery and the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
7 MASS. BAR ASS'N SEC. REV. 8, 9 (2005) ("[W]hen documents have already been viewed by
third parties there is little that can be done to undo the damage or unring the bell.");
Gallagher, supra note 48 (addressing the "Pandora's Box" problem).
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protocols in the Rules, and thereby tinker with the law of privilege
waiver? Academia has no ready answer. By examining the Rules
Enabling Act, the history of rulemaking, and views on the propriety
of judicial modification of substantive rights, this Note will posit
that only an affirmative act of Congress could give credence to
clawbacks and quick-peeks, given their implications for privilege
law.
The Rules Enabling Act lays out procedures for the transmission
of proposed federal rules to Congress, vesting rulemaking authority
in the judiciary.116 The second part of 28 U.S.C. § 2074 provides,
however, that "[a]ny such rule creating, abolishing, or modifying
an evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless
approved by Act of Congress."'1 17 In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)
states that the rules prescribed by the Supreme Court "shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."1 ' Congress,
therefore, twice emphasized that the judiciary lacks the power to
rework substantive evidentiary privileges. A Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure giving a green light to the use of clawbacks and quick-
peeks constitutes a modification of the contours of privilege law and
a usurpation of congressional authority.
No cases have directly addressed the issue of whether a rule such
as proposed Rule 26(b)(5)(B) oversteps the scope of the judiciary's
rulemaking authority.'19 In fact, the only authority which the
Advisory Committee cites is a Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
containing parallel language. 120 Several public comments to the
proposed rules, however, express concerns about 26(b)(6)(B)
contravening the Rules Enabling Act. 121
116. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (2000).
117. Id. § 2074(b).
118. Id. § 2072(b).
119. Marcus Memorandum, supra note 27, at 24.
120. TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.3(d). Texas does not have a statute equivalent to 28 U.S.C. §
2074(b). Henry S. Noyes, Is E-Discovery So Different that It Requires New Discovery Rules?
An Analysis of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 71 TENN. L.
REV. 585, 647 n.293 (2004).
121. See, e.g., Noyes, supra note 120, at 647 ("[Sluch amendments [addressing privilege
waiver] might be construed as 'creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary privilege'
and therefore would not have any effect unless approved by Congress.") (footnote omitted);
James E. Rooks, Jr., Will E-Discovery Get Squeezed?, 40 TRIAL 18, 22 (2004) ("[l]f adopted,
this amendment would apply to all discovery, not just e-discovery. It would create a new
substantive right with regard to privileged material, which is outside the rulemakers' power
2005] 685
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Case law on the substance-versus-procedure issue complicating
decisions under the Rules Enabling Act is minimally useful in
determining whether the proposed Rule 26(b)(5)(B) really modifies
a substantive right. In Hanna v. Plumer,122 the Supreme Court
found that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1) (regarding service
of process in diversity actions) did not exceed Congress' mandate
under the Rules Enabling Act. 123 Prescribing the method by which
a defendant is alerted that an action has been filed against him
sufficiently relates to rules of practice and procedure. 124 "The test
must be whether a rule really regulates procedure[-the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard
or infraction of them.' 25
The Court conceded that most changes to rules of practice and
procedure affect the rights of litigants, but "Congress' prohibition
of any alteration of substantive rights of litigants was obviously not
addressed to such incidental effects as necessarily attend the
adoption of the prescribed new rules of procedure upon the rights
of litigants .... ".126 The Hanna Court could not have contemplated the
impact of a change in privilege waiver law, as embodied in a
proposed Federal Rule authorizing clawbacks and quick-peeks. It
is difficult to see how eroding the sanctity of privileges, compromis-
ing lawyers' professional duties, and prejudicing clients' cases can
be deemed "incidental effects."
Another key Rules Enabling Act case, ICG Communications, Inc.
v. Allegiance Telecom,127 held that the court could compel discovery
under Federal Rule 26(c) despite the Telecommunications Act's
prohibition against turning over confidential customer information
"except as required by law."12 The court stated that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure have the effect of law, and essentially bear
under the Rules Enabling Act.") (footnote omitted); Testimony, supra note 48, at 6 ("A ...
problem exists in that this provision appears to be a substantive change in the law of
privilege, which is outside allowable rulemaking powers under the Rules Enabling Act.....
122. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
123. Id. at 463-64.
124. Id. at 464.
125. Id. (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).
126. Id. at 465.
127. 211 F.R.D. 610 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
128. Id. at 610-11.
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the imprimatur of Congress.129 Ultimately the court found that,
despite the defendant's contention that compelling discovery in
violation of the privacy provisions of the Telecommunications Act
would abridge a substantive right, the "except as required by law"
stipulation in the Telecommunications Act included court-ordered
discovery under the Federal Rules. 130 In the context of proposed
Rule 26(b)(5)(B), by contrast, there is no legislatively created
exception to which the judiciary may cite allowing it to flout
Congress's express reservation of power to modify substantive
rights.
The history of federal rulemaking is only slightly more instruc-
tive about the proper roles of the judiciary and Congress in dealing
with evidentiary privileges. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 sprang
from Congress's rejection of an attempt to codify various privileges
and left privilege law in the hands of common law courts. The rule
provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by
the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the
privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political
subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience. 1 '
As to why Congress in 1972 refused to allow the inclusion of eight
privileges in the Rules of Evidence, Professor Timothy Glynn offers
a compelling hypothesis: "[V]arious commentators, members of
Congress, and a former Supreme Court Justice expressed concern
that the proposed privilege rules-and the governing state and
federal standards that they were designed to replace-were
substantive in nature.' 1 32 Glynn notes that critics of the proposed
Rule 501 argued that evidentiary privileges "reflected substantive
policy judgments regarding and regulating certain relationships." '133
129. Id. at 613.
130. Id. at 614-15.
131. FED. R. EVID. 501.
132. Glynn, supra note 106, at 88 (footnote omitted).
133. Id. at 89.
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Therefore, the argument continued, unlike other types of
evidentiary rules designed merely to facilitate reliability in the
fact-finding process, the proposed Article V rules could not be
viewed as procedural in nature. Thus, according to the critics,
evidentiary privileges were not appropriate subjects for judicial
rule making under the Rules Enabling Act because judicially-
crafted rules may not "abridge, enlarge, or modify any substan-
tive right."
' 13 4
Glynn concludes: "Congress ultimately decided that, if codified
privilege rules were to be adopted for the federal courts, it, rather
than the judiciary, should adopt them. 135
After the generic version of Rule 501 was passed, Congress
amended the Rules Enabling Act to prescribe procedures for
effecting future changes to the Federal Rules through the
rulemaking process.136 Reflecting "Congress's continuing view that
any codification of evidentiary privileges is Congress's own preroga-
tive rather than that of the Supreme Court," Congress made a
special exception for privileges.' 37 Congress has largely removed
itself from the privilege realm since Rule 501's passage, leaving the
actual development of privilege doctrine to the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts.
1 38
There has been a general movement away from judicial
rulemaking in recent years which has affected commentators' views
of the judiciary's involvement in privilege rulemaking. Professor
Robert Bone explains:
The professional romance with court rulemaking and the
Federal Rules began to sour in the early 1970s. Critics attacked
134. Id. (footnotes omitted).
135. Id. at 90.
136. Id. at 92.
137. Id. at 93. An "act of Congress" is more than that body's approval of a proposed set of
Federal Rules crafted by the judiciary. After a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is drafted by
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and reviewed by the Standing Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure and the Supreme Court, Congress can only exercise a veto. Robert
G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and
Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 892 (1999). Congress agreed to hold negative power
with regard to federal rulemaking, except in the area of privilege law.
138. Glynn, supra note 106, at 93. Congress's decision to let privilege law evolve in the
courts is distinct from allowing the judiciary to codify privilege rules through the rulemaking
process.
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the notion that there was an ideal procedure embedded in
existing practice and codified in the Federal Rules. As a result,
the boundary between procedure and substance blurred, and the
case for expert rulemaking weakened.139
As a result of the civil rights, environmental, and consumer
protection movements, which catalyzed the creation of a host of
new substantive rights, a shift toward a legislative rulemaking
paradigm occurred.14 ° The new focus was on interest group
competition, greater political involvement, and accountability in
rulemaking.14' In the mid- 1990s, after the House of Representatives
considered several bills aimed at making substantial changes to
federal procedure as part of its "Contract with America," the
judiciary witnessed Congress's increased interest in rulemaking.'42
Critics of traditional judicial rulemaking, although recognizing the
legitimacy of the judiciary's power to create procedural rules under
the Rules Enabling Act, have called for greater congressional
involvement in rulemaking, including revised rulemaking proce-
dures. 143
139. Bone, supra note 137, at 900.
140. Id. at 900-07.
141. Id. at 903-05.
142. Id. at 906.
143. Id. at 907. Bone explains that critics of judicial rulemaking think that any
justification behind a procedural rule requires the weighing of substantive values, and should
thus be done by a politically accountable process. Id. at 910; see also Stephen B. Burbank,
The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1463, 1473 (1987).
Because avowedly procedural rules may have either substantive purposes or
substantive effects, consideration should be given to the political legitimacy of
the process by which they are formulated or applied and of the actors who are
formulating or applying them. Rather than giving up on the procedure/
substance dichotomy, we should craft it with attention to its ultimately political
ramifications.
Id. (footnote omitted). Burbank asserts that the federal judiciary buries its substantive policy
choices in the Federal Rules, raising serious concerns about accountability, democratic
values, and allocation of power in rulemaking. Id. at 1475. But see Bone, supra note 137, at
954.
The critics are correct in one respect: there is no clear normative divide between
procedure and substance. Procedural rules do have substantive effects and
require a potentially controversial weighing of substantive values. However,
this does not mean, as the critics claim, that a court rulemaking process
divorced from political accountability and allowing only limited public
participation is necessarily illegitimate.
Id. Robert Bone justifies court rulemaking based on a theory of procedural law and defends
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
In response to the academic debate over rulemaking in recent
years, courts and scholars have considered the controversy as
applied to evidentiary privilege law. Although conceding that
privileges have both procedural 44 and substantive'45 elements,
Raymond Miller argues that privileges have predominantly
procedural implications because they control what types of evidence
can be introduced at trial.'46 According to Miller, "[p]rivileges have
a more significant effect on the function of the judicial system than
on the creation of beneficial relationships."'47
Miller and other proponents of judicial rulemaking are provincial
in their focus on the procedural impacts of privileges, namely the
exclusion of certain evidence in court.148 Although giving superficial
mention to the substantive aspects of privileges, they effectively
ignore the complexities and societal underpinnings of privilege law.
The Third Circuit even espoused the view that Congress is better
equipped to modify privilege law: "Congress, through its legislative
mechanisms, is ... better suited for the task of defining the scope of
any prospective privilege. Congress is able to consider, for example,
society's moral, sociological, economic, religious and other values
without being confined to the evidentiary record in any particular
case."'
149
Congressional action is especially necessary and appropriate for
a rule that would substantially modify the scope of not one, but all
of the evidentiary privileges.' Although this Note has focused on
clawbacks' and quick-peeks' effects on the functioning of the
attorney-client privilege, data disclosed to opposing counsel absent
the judicial model against challenges to its legitimacy and effectiveness. Id.
144. Raymond F. Miller, Comment, Creating Evidentiary Privileges: An Argument for the
Judicial Approach, 31 CONN. L. REV. 771, 795 (1999) ("[P]rivileges dictate procedures by
which courts administer justice.").
145. Id. ("[A] privilege is a substantive law that may impact the nature and type of
relationships enjoyed by citizens.").
146. Id. at 797.
147. Id. at 795.
148. Id.
149. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 103 F.3d 1140, 1154-55 (3d Cir. 1997) (footnote
omitted).
150. See Glynn, supra note 106, at 156 ("Under the Rules Enabling Act, only Congress can
codify privilege law for the federal judicial system, and only Congress can implement other
holistic changes .... Congressional action, therefore, is needed for any significant national
reform addressing privilege law.").
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a thorough privilege review may contain information protected by
a work-product, priest-penitent, psychotherapist-patient, husband-
wife, state secrets, or other privilege. What the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure are trying to do through proposed Rule 26(b)(5)(B),
even though the language is not mandatory, is to abridge all of
these privileges by endorsing protocols that defy the common law
of privilege waiver, allow opposing parties to exploit privileged
disclosures, and risk waiving clients' privileges vis-a-vis third
parties. Clawbacks and quick-peeks narrow the scope of the
protection provided by evidentiary privileges. Although that effect
is arguably salutary in terms of enhancing the search for truth in
litigation, Congress is the proper branch to decide the issue.
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO CLAWBACKS AND QUICK-PEEKS
Proposed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B) may face
further resistance, but it may pass nonetheless. Regardless of
whether the new Rules expressly authorize these protocols, lawyers
will continue to incorporate clawbacks and quick-peeks in their
discovery regimens. This Part will demonstrate that practitioners
need not take on the risks and professional liabilities associated
with clawback and quick-peek agreements in order to moderate the
discovery burden'5 ' and guard against privilege waiver.
151. One of the principal justifications for clawbacks and quick-peeks, of course, is their
purported ability to save money and time. Some argue, however, that this rationale is
grounded in fiction. Henry Noyes of Pillsbury Winthrop challenges the contention that the
involvement of electronic data in a case necessarily translates into increased discovery
burdens:
[T]here is nothing unique about electronic information that prevents a party or
its attorneys from conducting an appropriate and effective review for privileged
communication. On the contrary, in many instances it will be easier to review
electronic information to determine the foundational factors that go into an
analysis of privilege-who created the information, who edited it, who received
the document, and when all of this occurred.
Noyes, supra note 120, at 601-02. Corporate litigator Darren Summerville concurs, noting
that "the searchability of electronic records might very well make privilege review easier
than a parallel type of review for 'hardcopy' records." Testimony by Darren Summerville,
Attorney, Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore, LLP, for Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments
to Civil Rules for Electronic Discovery (Jan. 28,2005). Summerville also argues that anyone
reviewing electronic information for responsiveness, "if efficient," conducts a simultaneous
privilege review. Id.
These testaments from practitioners who are familiar with the demands of complex
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Attorneys should first look to provisions in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure that can limit the scope of discovery and reduce the
risk of inadvertent disclosures.152 Rule 26(b)(1) permits discovery of
only nonprivileged materials that are "relevant to the claim or
defense of any party."'53 Although the relevance standard for
discovery is more relaxed than that for the admissibility of evidence
at trial, the relevance requirement can eliminate review of large
amounts of information. In addition, Rule 26(b)(2) allows courts to
limit the scope of discovery for reasons of duplication or undue
burden and expense:
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods other-
wise permitted under these rules and by any local rule shall be
limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the discovery
sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtain-
able from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery
has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain
the information sought; or (iii) the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into
account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the
parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the
litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in
resolving the issues."'
This provision is especially helpful in litigation involving high
volumes of electronically stored information. For example, a party
may be exempted from undergoing tedious processes to render
certain computerized data into readable form when the same
information is available in hard copy or from another source.
litigation cast serious doubts on the entire purpose behind clawback and quick-peek
agreements. If there is a possibility that the protocols they endorse do not result in
meaningful savings, the proposed privilege waiver rules would only deceive, and subject
lawyers to risks not offset by any advantages. This Note assumes marginal efficiency gains
from clawback and quick-peek agreements, but invites lawyers to question whether, in their
experience, electronic information by its nature mandates uniquely laborious privilege
reviews.
152. FED. R. CIV. P. 26; Noona, supra note 5, at III-1 to -6.
153. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
154. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2).
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Parties can use numerous techniques to minimize the risks of
unintentional disclosure without having to rely on the subjective
determination of a court. Having a well-organized review and
production system in place, ensuring a final review of the produc-
tion set before shipping it to opposing counsel, and working closely
with electronic discovery consultants and experts are essential
practices in digital evidence cases.1 5 Parties should also take
advantage of new technologies to segregate potentially privileged
information for review,'56 and limit review to relevant text or a
certain time frame or data type."5 ' Computer forensics expert Joan
Feldman urges parties to avoid the use of office computers to store,
index, and manipulate evidence. 5 ' When dealing with experts and
third-party consultants, Feldman cautions that parties should only
entrust them with evidence after signing a written agreement with
confidentiality and chain of custody provisions.'59
An increasingly popular case management technique is the use
of neutral experts to collect all of a party's requested information,
compile it onto CD-ROMs, and remit the information to the party
for privilege review. 6 ° The privilege review process then becomes
markedly more manageable. Computer forensics experts can be
enlisted also in the document review process to perform sophisti-
cated functions such as text searching, filtering, and sorting data
for review. 161 These experts can be extremely helpful in minimizing
the amount of data reviewed'62 and ensuring that privileged
information is not inadvertently disclosed.' 6
3
An expert may take the form of a special master as authorized by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53.164 The Rule allows courts to
appoint a master to "perform duties consented to by the parties" or
to "address pretrial ... matters that cannot be addressed effectively
and timely by an available district judge or magistrate judge of the
155. LANGE & NIMSGER, supra note 1, at 51.
156. Id.
157. FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 6-25.
158. Id. at 12-4.
159. Id. at 12-5.
160. Id. at 6-18.
161. Id. at 6-21.
162. Id. at 6-30.
163. Id. at 6-23.
164. FED. R. CIV. P. 53; MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 3, § 11.446.
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district."'65 In Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc.,66 the court
granted the plaintiffs' motion to appoint a computer forensics
expert to retrieve stored data from one of the defendant's hard
drives. 167 Determining that the hard drive contained potentially
relevant information that was being lost through normal use of the
computer, the court laid out a procedure whereby the expert would
investigate, copy, and image the data stored on the hard drive.'68
The court in Playboy Enterprises v. Welles'69 outlined a similar
protocol permitting a computer expert to retrieve deleted e-mails
from the defendant's hard drive. 170 The expert was directed to
create a mirror image of the drive, sign a protective order, and act
as an officer of the court.171 The protective order provided that the
expert's exposure to privileged information would not waive the
defendant's privilege rights:
To the extent the computer specialist has direct or indirect
access to information protected by the attorney-client privilege,
such "disclosure" will not result in a waiver of the attorney-
client privilege. Plaintiff herein, by requesting this discovery, is
barred from asserting in this litigation that any such disclosure
to the Court designated expert constitutes any waiver by
Defendant of any attorney-client privilege. 172
Finally, the Sedona Conference, hostile to clawbacks and quick-
peeks, condones the use of case management orders providing that
an inadvertent disclosure will not effect a waiver of privilege. 73 The
court in In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Products Liability
Litigation,174 a multidistrict consolidated class action, entered a
165. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a)(1)(A), (C).
166. 210 F.R.D. 645 (D. Minn. 2002).
167. Id. at 653.
168. Id. at 652-54.
169. 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
170. Id. at 1051-55.
171. Id. at 1054.
172. Id. at 1055. For a similar protocol stipulating that "disclosure of a communication to
the expert shall not be deemed a waiver of the attorney-client privilege or any other
privilege," see Simon Property Group LP v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639, 642 (S.D. Ind.
2000).
173. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 15, at 38.
174. 129 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
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comprehensive case management order containing an exemplary
privilege waiver provision:
In the event that a privileged document is inadvertently
produced by any party to this proceeding, the party may request
that the document be returned. In the event that such a request
is made, all parties to the litigation and their counsel shall
promptly return all copies of the document in their possession,
custody, or control to the producing party and shall not retain or
make any [copies]. Such inadvertent disclosure of a privileged
document shall not be deemed a waiver with respect to that
document or other documents involving similar subject
matter.175
These protective orders still require a traditional privilege review,
and "should not be used to force parties to relinquish privilege
rights." '176
CONCLUSION
Clawbacks and quick-peeks disobey decades of common law
privilege jurisprudence, tempt lawyers to violate their ethical
duties, and can easily lose their force in third-party contexts. They
should not be codified in the Federal Rules given these deficiencies
and the judiciary's questionable authority to modify the functioning
of evidentiary privileges. If enacted, Rule 26(b)(5)(B) need not steer
courts and parties. Rather than compromising their professionalism
by experimenting with risky protocols, lawyers are urged to adopt
both traditional and high-tech measures to lessen the burden of
document review and guard against privilege waiver.
Hiring computer forensics specialists and putting resources into
accessing obscure "metadata" may sound daunting, or even cost
prohibitive; however, experts are becoming indispensable in modern
complex litigation, and their streamlined processes save valuable
175. Id. at 1219. See also the protective order in Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v.
Michelson, 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1159 (W.D. Tenn. 2003), providing that 'Medtronic waives no
privilege for documents or subject matter produced through any of the discovery protocols
in this order." Id. at 1176. The Medtronic court mandated a thorough privilege review with
detailed requirements. Id. at 1172-76.
176. Withers, supra note 29, at 27.
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time and money. With their assistance, privilege review becomes a
much lighter chore. In more routine cases in which discovery may
largely involve paper documents, the traditional rules are triggered
to limit the scope of production.
Clawbacks and quick-peeks present an enticing way of doing
things. The arguably minimal time and expense that they save are
simply not worth it when alternatives abound. The workability of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure up to this point, and the
advent of experts devoted to simplifying the discovery process,
signal that electronic document review can proceed quite effectively
without resorting to tactics corrosive to the legal profession, the
attorney-client relationship, and the integrity of the Rules Enabling
Act.
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